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Abstract
Following insights by Bewley (1999a), this paper analyses a model with down-
ward rigidities in which rms cannot pay discriminate based on year of entry
to a rm, and develops an equilibrium model of wages and unemployment.
We solve for the dynamics of wages and unemployment under conditions of
downward wage rigidity, where forward looking rms take into account these
constraints. We show that there is a frontloading incentive which leads to a
simple solution in the case of no uncertainty. Using productivity data from
the post-war US economy, we analyse the ability of the model to match certain
stylised labour market facts.
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1 Introduction
Truman Bewley has argued that there are two key features constraining wage cuts
for new hires in recessions (Bewley (1999a)). Because wage cuts for incumbents
will have a negative impact on morale, rms avoid them under all but extreme
circumstance; at the same time while new hires may be willing to work at a lower
wage than that paid to incumbents, paying them less would disrupt internal equity
and so their wages will be set at the same level as incumbents:
New employees, in contrast, feel it is inequitable to be paid according
to a scale lower than the one that applied to colleagues that were hired
earlier. For this reason, downward pay rigidity for new hires exists only
because the pay of existing employees is rigid. (Bewley (1999b))
Bewleys account mainly concentrates on the question of why rms do not cut
wages in recession. But it raises the important question of how forward looking
rms take into account the fact that such constraints downward rigidity combined
with equal treatment of new hires may arise in the future. For example, a
rm, anticipating downward wage rigidity, may temper wage increases in better
times. Indeed, one might ask in Bewleys analysis what determines the initial wage
which is too high once recession strikes. Or in more generality, and supposing that
rms can o¤er long-term contracts, the rm must take into account these equal
treatment constraints which may prevent it bringing in new hires at a low wage in
downturns, and also prevent the rm hiring at a higher wage than that o¤ered to
incumbents when the labour market is tight.1 What are the implications for wages
and employment in an equilibrium model with forward looking rms and workers?
1Bringing in workers at higher pay than incumbents is even more problematic; thus while in
contrast to the primary sector Bewley found evidence that new hires are sometimes paid a lower
rate than incumbents in the secondary sector, even there, paying new hires more than incumbents
is deemed to be very disruptive (Bewley (1999a, p. 320)).
1
In this paper we attempt to accomplish two things. First we solve a dynamic
equilibrium model in which rms take into account downward rigidity constraints.
Secondly, we investigate whether the resulting wage and unemployment dynamics
have reasonable properties when judged against US post-war experience.
In more detail: To analyse the dynamic consequences of Bewleys insights,
we analyse a model in which the pay of new hires and existing workers is linked
within each rm indeed is identical, given that we assume all workers are perfect
substitutes and in which the pay of incumbents is subject to some downward rigid-
ity. This rigidity is then transmitted to the pay of new hires.2 Workers and rms
then must anticipate the e¤ects of this, so that for example with full downward rigid-
ity, an increase in current wages means that future wages cannot be cut below this
level. Despite the enormous literature which exists on downward rigidities, there has
been almost no analysis of the forward looking nature of the decision problem and
its labour market implications (the only exception we are aware of is Elsby (2009),
who solves a problem involving downward nominal rigidities, but in a very di¤erent
context).
To do this, we take the equal treatment model of Snell and Thomas (2009) and
add an explicit downward rigidity constraint.3 We do not, it should be stressed, at-
tempt to provide an explicit foundation for the two constraints.4 In the unrestricted
model without the downward rigidity restriction because of equal treatment of
workers rms have to trade-o¤ the desire to insure their risk-averse workers against
2We stress the point that for there to be signicant labour market implications it is necessary
that downward rigidity applies to new hires if it only applies to incumbent workers so that new
hires can be hired at a exible wage, there is no reason why hiring decisions should not be e¢ cient.
3We also extend that model to multiple sectors, an extension which is crucial for addressing
recent empirical evidence.
4Snell and Thomas (2009) show how equal treatment can be endogenised if the contracting
environment is at willand a similar argument could be used here. A closely related approach is
developed by Menzio and Moen (2008). Similar issues arise in the insider-outsider literature; see
Gottfries and Sjostrom (2000).
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the need to respond to market conditions to not only prevent their workers from
quitting, but also to take advantage of states of the world where labour is cheap.
The insurance motive alone provides a degree of downward rigidity. In this paper
we add to this model downward wage restrictions in the spirit of Bewley to see
how the performance of the model changes. A rm will face not only a sequence of
participation constraints if it needs to retain existing, or hire in new, workers, but
also a constraint each period restricting the degree to which it can cut its wage. A
major challenge of the analysis is to solve for an equilibrium in the face of these
constraints.
We show that the combination of equal treatment and su¢ cient labour turnover
leads to a frontloading incentive. If a rm is not constrained next period, either by
the participation constraint or by the downward rigidity constraint, then it will
want to increase current wages at the expense of future wages. The reason for
this is that a worker employed today puts less weight on future wages than does
the rm: because of (exogenous) turnover there is a chance that the worker will
not receive the future wage, but the rm will still pay by equal treatment the
same wage to a new hire who replaces this worker. For the case where there is no
uncertainty (so rms perfectly anticipate all future productivity changes) this allows
us to deduce that the wage will always be up against one of the constraints and we
are able to provide a complete characterization of equilibrium provided that the
downward rigidity constraint is not too loose (does not allow too large a reduction
in real wages). Unfortunately this result doesnt fully generalise to the case with
uncertainty, although we present a result for a two-period model.
The equal treatment assumption prevents rms from cutting wages for new
entrants, so that in periods with adverse shocks the wage may not fall su¢ ciently
to clear the labour market. In the absence of equal treatment, wage rigidity in this
model (with xed hours) would not have employment e¤ects, as utilities o¤ered to
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new entrants would be exible. We show however that (under certain conditions)
rms hire up to the point where the real wage equals the marginal product of labour;
to the extent then that wages do not correspond to market-clearing levels hiring will
be ine¢ cient; in fact we show that this occurs only in the direction of wages being
too high leading to ine¢ ciently low employment and an excess supply of labour.
Not only do we solve for an equilibrium of a model when forward looking rms
have downward constraints, but we also look at whether the equilibrium wage and
unemployment dynamics look reasonable. We argue that our model, when simu-
lated with sectoral productivity shocks, is capable of generating simulation results
that are reasonably consistent with empirical unemployment and wage movements
over the business cycle. We nd that this model produces more reasonable wage-
unemployment dynamics than Snell and Thomas (2009).
An outline of the paper is as follows. We start by looking at whether there is
evidence for the equal treatment assumption in Section 2. Then we lay out the basic
assumptions of our model in Section 3 and the next two subsections. In Section 3.1.2
we prove a simple characterization of the equilibrium when there is no uncertainty.
We discuss the basic resultsin Section 3.2. In Section 3.2.1 we discuss to what extent
these results extend to the uncertainty case. In Section 4 we simulate the model
using sectoral TFP data from the postwar US economy to generate predictions of
wage and unemployment movements, and see to what extent these satisfy certain
stylised facts. Finally Section 5 contains concluding comments.
2 Evidence for equal treatment
While we simply impose that all workers within a rm must be paid the same,
we here briey review some empirical evidence on the issue of equal treatment.
An early study was Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994), who examined the pay
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of managerial employees in a single rm over time. They found that incumbents
pay tends to move together, but the pay of entrants is signicantly more variable,
suggesting that the pay of new hires may be more subject to outside conditions than
that of incumbents. However they do not formally control for composition of entry
cohorts, so it is di¢ cult to know what the cause of this extra variability is. Wachter
and Bender (2008) have recently run a similar analysis on a number of rms in a
large German manufacturing sector, and they, too, nd evidence of substantial and
quite persistent entry cohort e¤ects. However these seem to be widely distributed
across rms at any given date, suggesting, as they note, that they are not driven
by cyclical phenomena. A study by Kwon and Milgrom (2005) of Swedish workers
nds that if cohort e¤ects for labour market entry and occupation entry are included
in addition to rm entry cohort e¤ects, the former two are procyclical in line with
expectation, while the latter actually appear countercyclical. In other words, a
worker entering the labour market in a downturn will tend to do worse than those
already active, but entering a rm in a downturn does not of itself lead to a lower
wage than that received by incumbents; in fact the opposite appears to be the
case. Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2007) argue that wages of those entering the
labour market from non-employment are considerably more variable than those who
remain in employment. This does not, though, imply that new hires are treated
di¤erently within particular rms. In a similar vein, Pissarides (2007) summarises
empirical studies that nd wages for workers who change jobs are considerably more
procyclical than those who remain with the same employer. Gertler and Trigari
(2009), however, argue that such studies are not demonstrating that the new hire
wage is more procyclical than a stayers wage within a particular rm. The reason
for the empirical nding could simply be that match quality varies procyclically.
Finally, as discussed above, survey evidence in Bewley (1999a) suggests that
violations of equal treatment are unusual, particularly in the primary sector. Similar
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ndings exist for other countries: Managers responded that hiring underbidders
would violate their internal wage policy (Agell and Lundborg (2003, p.7), based
on a Swedish survey); in a British survey, Kaufman (1984) reported that almost
all managers viewed bringing in similarly qualied workers at lower wage rates as
infeasible.Akerlof and Yellen (1990) argue that personnel management texts treat
the need for equitable pay as virtually self-evident.
3 The model
The model is as follows. Time runs from t = 1; 2; 3; : : : ; T , where T  2 is nite,
and there is a single consumption good each period (all wages below are real wages).
There areM equal sized sectors. All workers are assumed to be identical, except for
the date at which they enter the labour market, and the sector to which they are
currently associated (we abstract from any tenure or experience e¤ects on produc-
tivity). Workers are risk averse with per period twice di¤erentiable utility function
u(w); u0 > 0; u00 < 0; where w  0 is the income which must be consumed within the
period; it is assumed that they can neither save nor borrow. There is no disutility
of work, but hours are xed so that workers are either employed or unemployed.
Assume that if workers are not employed in a period, they receive some low con-
sumption level c > 0: There is a large (but xed) number of identical risk-neutral
rms in each sector. A rm in sector m has a diminishing returns technology where
output is Fm(N; st) with @Fm=@N > 0; @2Fm=@N2 < 0; where N is labour input
and st is the current shock (which species current productivity in each sector). It
is assumed that a rm must always employ some (minimum measure of) workers
each period.5 Workers and rms discount the future with common factor  2 (0; 1].
5This can be motivated by an assumption that rms cannot produce after a period of zero
production.
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For an employed worker, there is a stayingprobability of  2 (0; 1) ; each pe-
riod, with workers exogenously separating with probability 1  ; separated workers
must seek work at a di¤erent rm; of the separated, a proportion  remain in the
same sector while (1 ) are distributed evenly across sectors.6 Likewise (1 ) of the
unemployed move to other sectors. (Thus all movements between rms and between
sectors are due to exogenous separations and workers cannot choose, for example,
which sector to move to.) Separation occurs at the end of a period so that separated
workers who nd a job in the following period do not su¤er any unemployment. We
assume there are a large number of workers relative to the number of rms, and we
normalize the ratio of workers to rms to be one in each sector and each period.7 We
assume that the spot wage/full employment solution (N = 1) is always greater
than the unemployment consumption level, i.e., that @Fm=@N(1; st) > c all t:
The shock st follows a stochastic process taking a nite number of possible
values, and with initial value s1; which we specify in more detail below. Let ht 
(s1; s2; : : : ; st) be the history at t. The labour market o¤ers a worker currently
looking for work in sector m (at the start of t, discounted to t) of mt = 
m
t (ht): this
is an average of the utility from remaining unemployed and that from from getting a
job where the weight depends on the probability of being hired as described below.
A rm must o¤er at least mt (ht) to prevent its workers from quitting, and this is
also the minimum utility that must be o¤ered to hire: We assume that the rm can
hire any number of workers by o¤ering at least mt (and cannot hire otherwise). So
the labour market is modelled as being competitive.
We summarise the timing as follows. At date 1 each rm in sector m o¤ers a
6We want to include multiple sectors in the model for the later simulation exercise. The fact
that generally some sectors will have positive unemployment while others have zero unemployment
means that the model does not have an aggregate unemployment rate that is often at a minimum
bound.
7We keep the labour force xed, although extending the model to allow exit and entry is
straightforward and does not a¤ect the results.
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single state-contingent wage contract (wmt (ht))
T
t=1 to which it is committed. Workers
then can accept contracts and period 1 production takes place. At the end of period
1; a rm loses a fraction (1   ) of its workforce due to exogenous separation, as
described above. At the start of each subsequent period t  2; rms and workers
observe st. Workers may quit costlessly at this point and join the pool of those
previously separated, the unemployed and new entrants to the sector, facing the
same probability of employment (so receive mt (ht)), but may not switch sectors.
However, provided the continuation utility o¤ered by the contract at least matches
mt ; the rm is able to retain its sta¤ and hire in as many new workers as it requires
from the pool of those looking for work. Production takes place and wages wmt (ht)
are paid, and so on.
3.1 The Firms problem
We work with a representative rm in sector m. At the start of date 1; after s1 is
observed, as just stated, rms in each sector m commit to contracts (wmt (ht))
T
t=1,
wmt (ht)  0, which we assume are not binding on workers. We assume equal treat-
ment within the rm: a worker joining subsequently, at  after history h , is o¤ered
a continuation of this same contract: (wmt (ht))
T
t= . (This is to be contrasted with the
case where discrimination is permitted where a worker joining at  would be o¤ered
a contract which in principle may be unrelated to that o¤ered to previous cohorts.)
To avoid cluttering the notation, we omit sector superscripts in what follows unless
necessary (so an omitted superscript implies that the sector ism). Let Vt (ht) denote
the continuation utility from t onwards from the contract, dened recursively by:
Vt (ht) = u(wt(ht)) + [EVt+1 (ht+1) + (1)
(1  )t+1 +
X
m0 6=m
(M   1) 1 (1  ) (1  )m0t+1 j ht];
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with VT+1 = 0, where E denotes expectation, and the terms involving t+1 and 
m0
t+1
reect the utility after exogenous separation, if the worker respectively remains in the
same sector or moves to another sector. Each rm also has a planned employment
path (Nt(ht))
T
t=1, where Nt (ht)  0:
Note that in (1) it is assumed that there are no layo¤s, only exogenously de-
termined separations. Our aim is to construct an equilibrium in which layo¤s do
not occur, largely because it substantially simplies the analytics of the solution.
Provided exogenous turnover is high enough relative to negative shocks, it can be
shown that the rm would always want to hire in new workers, and would not want
to replace any existing ones, so we henceforth assume the parameters are consistent
with this.8
The problem faced by the rm, which takes the stochastic sequence of outside
option values in its sector, (t)
T
t=1 ; as parametric (as well as those in other sectors),
is:
max
(wt(ht))
T
t=1;(Nt(ht))
T
t=1
E
"
TX
t=1
()t 1 (Fm(Nt(ht); st) Nt(ht)wt(ht))
#
(Problem DWR)
subject to
Vt (ht)  t (ht) (2)
for all positive probability ht; T  t  1, and
wt (ht 1; s)  b (ht 1; s)w (ht 1) ; (3)
for all positive probability ht 1; all s 2 S with st 1s > 0; T  t  2: (2) is the
participation constraint that says that at any point the contract must o¤er at least
8For details see the arguments in Snell and Thomas (2009) which apply in the current setting
mutatis mutandis. Note that given that the rate of separation is exogenous, it is changes in hiring
that drive movements in unemployment in our model. This is consistent with Hall (2005), who
argues that the separation rate in the US labor market is roughly constant (see also Pissarides
(1986), Shimer (2005)), and that although job losses rise during recessions, the increase is usually
very small in relation to the normal levels of separations. However, these conclusions have been
disputed (see Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009)).
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what a worker can get by quitting, and (3) is the ad hoc downward constraint that
imposes that wages cannot fall at a rate faster than an amount which may depend
on the current state (e.g., to capture ination), given by b (ht). For b = 1 we have
downward real wage rigidity, and for b = 0 we have the problem in which there is
no downward constraint on wages. Downward nominal rigidity would be captured
by b(ht) = pt 1=pt, where pt is the price level at t (prices play no other role in this
model).
3.1.1 Equilibrium
We shall use a  superscript to denote equilibrium values.9 We are looking for sym-
metric solutions, i.e., where all rms in a sector choose the same contract (though
we do not need symmetry across sectors). To close the model we impose an equa-
tion specifying the equilibrium determination, given (wt (ht))
T
t=1 ; (N

t (ht))
T
t=1 ; of the
outside option in sector m:
t =
Nt   Nt 1
1  Nt 1
V t +
1 Nt
1  Nt 1
Ut; (4)
N0 = 0, where V

t is the equilibrium contract o¤er at t and Ut is the discounted
utility of a worker who is unemployed at t  that is, who currently has failed to nd
a job. The number of workers who remain in a job from t  1 is Nt 1, the survival
rate times the number employed in the sector at time t  1. Thus the denominator
of the coe¢ cient on V t is the number of workers not retained after t   1; in other
words the number seeking work at t, while the numerator is the number of hires at
t). Ut in turn is given by
Ut(ht) = u(c) + (E

t+1 j ht

+X
m0 6=m
(M   1) 1(1  )E
h
m
0
t+1 j ht
i
); (5)
9This subsection broadly follows Snell and Thomas (2009), mutatis mutandis, including proofs
of the lemmas, which we therefore omit.
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i.e., the utility from the reservation wage plus future utility from not having a job
at the beginning of t + 1. Given the endpoint condition m
0
T+1 = 0, all m
0, (4), (1)
and (5) uniquely determine Ut; V t and t.
Note that there are two cases: if the labour market in sector m at time t
clears, Nt (ht) = 1, then from (4) t (ht) must o¤er the utility o¤ered by other rms.
In symmetric equilibrium, other rms in the same sector are o¤ering an identical
contract, and so it is the utility associated with this, V t (ht) ; which must be o¤ered.
If, on the other hand, there is excess supply of labour,10 Nt (ht) < 1, the outside
opportunity will depend on the probability of getting a job.
We can summarise:
Denition 1
 
w
m
t (ht)
T
t=1
; (Nmt (ht))
T
t=1
M
m=1
constitutes a symmetric equilibrium
if it solves Problem DWR for each m where (mt )
T
t=1 is determined recursively from
(1), (4) and (5).
Employment is determined by a standard marginal productivity equation (again
suppressing sector superscripts):
Lemma 1 In a symmetric equilibrium Nt (ht) satises
@F (Nt (ht); st)=@N = w

t (ht): (6)
This is a very useful implication of the combination of equal treatment and
positive hiring. E¤ectively the rm can neutralisean extra hire today by hiring
 fewer workers next period (possible by positive hiring), so that employment from
next period on is unchanged. Notice that this requires equal treatment if hires
10Intuitively, the case of excess demand for labour cannot arise in equilibrium, as an innites-
simally small increase in the wage would cure the individual rms supply problem. In contrast,
because of equal treatment the case of excess supply can arise since workers cannot undercut.
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next period were brought in on a di¤erent contract this neutralisation would not be
possible. The only consideration is thus whether the extra worker makes a prot
today, that is whether the current marginal product exceeds the wage; if it does the
rm should hire more workers, so at an optimum there must be equality (because
of positive hiring today the same logic applies in reverse if the current marginal
product is less than the wage). In this argument the wage contract is held xed at
its optimum.
Suppose that at some t; the participation constraint binds. Then there must
be full employment and the wage is determined by marginal productivity at full
employment:
Lemma 2 In a symmetric equilibrium the participation constraint binds at ht if and
only if Nt (ht) = 1; moreover if the constraint binds then w

t (ht) = @F (1; st)=@N:
The argument for the rst assertion of the lemma is simply that in a symmetric
equilibrium if there is full employment, the quitting will give a worker the same
utility as she can move immediately to another rm with an identical contract
(by symmetry), so the worker is indi¤erent about leaving, i.e., the participation
constraint binds. If, on the other hand, there is unemployment, then again by
symmetry a worker must be worse o¤ should she quit since at best she will get the
same contract, but now there is a chance she will end up unemployed. Consequently
the participation constraint must be slack.
We dene wms = @F
m(1; s)=@N; which in view of the second assertion of Lemma
2 is the equilibrium wage when the participation constraint binds in state s, but note
that it would also be the wage in a spot version of the model. (The assertion follows
from noting that full employment implies, from Lemma 1, that the wage must be
at the spot level.)
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The above is very useful as Lemma 1 tells us that if the contract wage is below
the spot wage for that state, we get employment above unity, which is infeasible.
So this case cannot occur11 and the contract wage must always be at or above the
spot wage. If wages are above the spot wage, on the other hand, there is unem-
ployment, and so by Lemma 2 the participation constraint cannot bind. We stress
that the foregoing does not depend on the form of the optimal wage contract (i.e.,
on optimally smoothing wages, taking into account downward rigidity constraints,
etc.), but only on equal treatment, and an optimal hiring policy for a given con-
tract, together with the hypothesis that rms always hire and that the equilibrium
is symmetric across rms in the sector.12
To proceed to an explicit solution, and in order to facilitate the empirical analy-
sis, we put more structure on the problem.13 This will allow us to assert, under cer-
tain conditions, that the wage updating rule in any sectorm is of the following simple
form: given wt compute wt+1 under the hypothesis that the participation constraint
at t+ 1 is not binding; if wt+1 > wst+1 then the hypothesis is conrmed and wt+1 is
the equilibrium wage; otherwise the constraint is binding and the equilibrium wage
will be at wst+1. The structure will also allow us to demonstrate su¢ cient conditions
for the symmetric hiring equilibrium to exist.
From henceforth assume each rm has technology given by, at time t,
Fm(N; st) =M
(m)
t + a
(m)
t N
1 =(1  ); (7)
11Intuitively, the reason that excess demand for labour at time t is impossible is the following.
A rm could, by an innitessimal increase in its wage, attract as many workers as it wishes. Even
with downward constraints, this will add at most a tiny amount to current and future wage costs,
but it allows for a non-negligible increase in current prots.
12Another useful implication of this is that our assumption that the spot wage is always above
the value of not working guarantees that equilibrium wages also always exceed this value. Thus
in our later characterization, we shall not need to worry about running into the constraint that
workers would rather not work than get or keep an employment contract.
13We also need the problem faced by the rm to be concave; concave production and utility
functions are not su¢ cient to guarantee this.
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for  6= 1, with Mt  0 and for  = 1, we specify Fm(N; st) = a(m)t log (N).
(M
(m)
t ; a
(m)
t ) is a sector specic shock that depends on the aggregate shock st. Note
that for  > 1, Fm has an upper bound given by M (m)t , which given that we are
modelling short-run production functions at the establishment or plant level, may
be appropriate. For  < 1, Fm has the more standard power function representation
(corresponding to a short-run Cobb-Douglas production function). We assume that
productivity shocks are not too bad (again dropping sector superscripts):
at+1=at > 
 (8)
with probability one (for example, with a log production function, this requires
only that productivity does not fall at a rate equal to turnover; since the latter
is typically estimated in the region of at least 30% on an annual basis, this is a
mild restriction). This will ensure in the solution derived below, provided wages are
su¢ ciently downward rigid, that rms will always need to hire in new workers (rms
always loose more workers through exogenous turnover than they wish to), thus
justifying our assumption that hiring always happens. We also assume henceforth
that workers have per-period utility functions of the constant relative risk aversion
family with coe¢ cient  > 1 described by u(c) = c1 =(1  ).14 Assume  > 1:15
We also have that the marginal product of labour equals atN t , so that using
(6),
Nt = a
1

t w
  1

t : (9)
Substituting Nt = 1 we nd that the spot wage is wt = at:
14For  = 1, set u(c) = log(c); all results go through.
15This is needed to make the optimisation problem concave. Hence if  < 1 (Cobb-Douglas) we
need the risk version coe¢ cient to be graeter than unity.
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3.1.2 No uncertainty
First we deal with the case of no uncertainty (so that all sectoral productivity
sequences are known at date 1 before contracts are entered into). In this case,
we show that the wage will always be kept as low as possible subject to it never
falling below the spot wage. With downward real rigidity this would imply that the
equilibrium satises w (ht) = maxt0twst0 .
As a rst step towards proving this, we demonstrate a frontloading result. The
lemma establishes a very useful fact if the model is deterministic (transition prob-
abilities are zero or one): provided the downward constraint is not too weak (for
example, with nominal rigidity, provided ination is not too large), then wages will
fall between any two dates by the maximum allowed by the downward constraint
unless the participation constraint at the later date binds.
The intuition is as follows: if wages next period are not up against the downward
constraint, then frontloading them by cutting next periods wage a small amount and
simultaneously increasing the current wage to compensate workers does not violate
any downward constraints. If in addition next periods participation constraint is
not binding then these too will be satised at all dates. This will increase prots
however. The reason is that because there is turnover a number of the current
workforce will be separated before next period to compensate workers the current
wage does not have to be increased too much as they discount the future wage
by the probability of separation (in addition to the discount factor). The rm,
however, puts greater weight on wages next period because it will have to pay them
to replacement workers (new hires) as well as to the surviving incumbents. Thus the
cut in future wages is valued more highly by the rm and prots rise. The argument
works so long as (a) wages are not falling too quickly, as then risk-averse workers
will need substantial additional compensation now for the steeper wage path, and
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(b) rms are hiring in new workers. Thus the downward constraint must not have
b(ht) too small, and also negative productivity shocks should not be so severe that
rms do not want to hire in new workers in some periods, a condition we had already
assumed in order to solve the model.
Lemma 3 Suppose there is no uncertainty. Then there exists a b < 1, such that
if b(ht+1) > b; all t, the following must hold: If in a solution to Problem DWR for
sector m the downward rigidity constraint does not bind in sector m between t and
t+ 1 then the participation constraint binds at t+ 1.
Proof. We use time subscripts rather than history dependent functions as there
is no uncertainty (and suppress sector m superscripts). Suppose to the contrary of
the claim wt > btwt 1 but the participation constraint does not bind at t+1: Starting
from the optimal contract, consider reshu­ ing wages between t and t+1 as follows:
decrease the wage at t+ 1 by a small amount wt+1 > 0 so that worker utility falls
by  > 0; and increase the wage at t by wt so that utility rises by x; and so as
to leave the worker indi¤erent; do not change the contract otherwise. This implies
that
 + x = 0 (10)
(where u0 (wt+1)wt+1 '  and u0 (wt)wt ' x). This frontloading satises all
participation constraints: worker utility falls at t+1 but the constraint was initially
slack by hypothesis, and so from this point on constraints are satised; similarly,
participation constraints are also satised both at t and earlier because utility is held
constant over the two periods. A su¢ ciently small change also satises the downward
rigidity constraint because at t+1 it was slack, while at t, wt+wt > wt  btwt 1;
and at t + 2; wt+1   wt+1 < wt+1  wt+2=bt+2. We write (ut; at) as the static
prot function at productivity level at (we can suppressMt which only shifts prots
16
up or down; see (15) below for the explicit function) when workers receive a current-
period utility of ut (= u (wt)), and N (ut; at) for the corresponding optimal labour
demand. The optimal contract must generate prots of (ut; at) at t (the choice of
Nt does not a¤ect the other constraints, so Nt must be chosen to maximise current
prots at the contract wage). The change in prots (viewed from ht) arising from
the frontloading is
P ' 0(ut+1; at+1)  0(ut; at)x: (11)
Dene " := min2tT [
 at+1=at   1], where, by (8), " > 0; so that
 at+1=at  1 + ": (12)
From Hotellings Lemma (converting wages to utilities), 0(u; a) =  N (u; a) =u0(w).
Thus,
0(ut; at+1)
0(ut; at)
=
N (ut; at+1)
N (ut; at)
=
a
1

t+1
a
1

t
  (1 + ")1= ; (13)
where the second equality follows from optimal labour demand N = a
1
w 
1
 (given
that ut and hence wages are constant in the ratio), and the inequality follows from
(12).
Next, (; a) is a concave function: Consider the static problem of maximizing
prots given that workers receive utility u, so that w = ((1  )u)1=(1 ). Substi-
tuting from the condition that the marginal product of labour equals the wage:
N = a
1
w 
1
 (14)
yields prots of
(u; at) Mt + a
1

t  ((1  )u) 
1 
(1 )
1   : (15)
As  > 1, this is a strictly concave function of u.
Given that wages rise at a gross rate greater than b, then if  > 1 (so utilities
are negative; a similar argument, though with some inequalities reversed, applies for
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 < 1 and we omit it),
ut+1
ut
=

wt+1
wt
1 
< b1  : (16)
Then from (15),
0(ut+1; at+1)
0(ut; at+1)
=

ut+1
ut
(  1(1 ))
> b(
 1
 ); (17)
where the inequality follows from (16). Substituting (10) into (11) yields
P ' 0(ut+1; at+1)  0(ut; at)x
= 0(ut; at)

0(ut+1; at+1)
0(ut; at)
  

> 0(ut; at)

 (1 + ")1= b(
 1
 )   

where the inequality follows from (13) and (17). Thus, provided b  (1 + ")  1 1 ;
P > 0. As the initial contract was assumed optimal, this is a contradiction. Given
 > 1, (1 + ") 
1
 1 < 1. Hence setting b = (1 + ") 
1
 1 ; the assertion of the
lemma follows.
We can now show that wages rising by the minimum given by the downward
constraint, unless this takes wages below the spot wage in which case the wage is set
to the latter, constitutes an equilibrium. We use a  to denote equilibrium values.
Proposition 1 Suppose there is no uncertainty and that b(ht) > b, all t. Then there
is a symmetric equilibrium in which in each sectorm, wmt+1 = maxfb (ht+1)wmt ; amt+1g;
t  2 and wm1 = am1 :
Proof. Suppose all other rms follow the putative equilibrium strategy and
hire so that they are on their labour demand curves, i.e., marginal product of labour
equal to the wage (this denes (t)
T
t=1 from (4)) and consider the optimal strategy
of a potential deviant rm (which exists by standard arguments) in sector m. We
show that any optimal strategy must coincide with the putative equilibrium strategy.
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Again we drop sector superscripts and write bt for b(ht). (i) If at T; the nal wage
in the deviant strategy wT < wT ; then if w

T = aT , there is full employment and
so to satisfy the participation constraint a wage wT  wT must be paid (see the
remark below Lemma 2), so the participation constraint would be violated by the
deviation strategy and it would be infeasible; on the other hand, if wT < aT , then
at t  1, wT 1 = wT=bT by denition of the equilibrium strategy, and wT < wT plus
downward rigidity implies wT 1  wT=bT < wT=bT , so the deviation contract o¤ers
less discounted utility at T   1: Again, if the participation constraint binds at T   1
for the equilibrium contract, the participation constraint would be violated for the
deviant, and if it does not bind, we can extend the argument back to T   2; etc.
As soon as the participation constraint binds for the putative equilibrium contract
(it must bind at t = 1 by w1 = a1; as this implies full employment in the sector
and hence by (4) a binding constraint), we will get a contradiction. (ii) If at T;
wT > w

T ; then the participation constraint is slack for the deviant contract and so
by Lemma 3 (recall we are looking at an optimal deviation contract, i.e., a solution
to Problem DWR), wT 1 = wT=bT and as wT  bTwT 1, wT 1 > wT 1. If at T   1
the participation constraint binds for the deviant contract, it would be violated for
the equilibrium contract, which is impossible. Thus it cannot bind at T   1, and we
can work backwards to the point where it last binds for the deviant (it must bind
at least at t = 1 as otherwise cutting w1 would improve prots without violating
any constraint), at which point again the deviant strategy o¤ers higher discounted
utility, a contradiction. We conclude that wT = wT . By similar arguments we can
show wT 1 = wT 1; and work backward to establish equality of the two contracts.
Thus deviation is not protable.
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3.2 Discussion
Thus, under the conditions of the proposition, the equilibrium wage contract can be
computed in a simple recursive fashion, starting at the spot wage in period 1; and
then proceeding by reducing wages if possible, due to the frontloading incentive, to
the extent permitted by the downward constraint and the need to stay above the
spot wage (i.e., to satisfy the participation constraint). The intuition behind the
latter is as follows. If the equilibrium wage were to fall below the spot wage, given
that each rm is on its labour demand function, there would be excess demand for
labour. Each rm would have an incentive then to slightly raise its wage above that
of its competitors in order to attract as many workers as it wants, so this could
not be an equilibrium. The equilibrium must occur when all wages are raised to
exactly the spot wage, for then a rm would not want to pay less (its workers would
leave as there is full employment), and nor would it want to pay more (because
of frontloading it will, in the putative equilibrium, be up against the downward
constraint in future unemployment states, so that paying more now would force it
to pay more in the future, raising wage costs for no benet).
To illustrate the solution, we take the actual productivity series (TFP) over the
period 1955 to 2001 for one of the manufacturing sectors that we use in the empiri-
cal exercise (see Section 4 for details). Figure 1 displays productivity and simulated
wages. The spot wage equals the productivity level (the thicker line), and Propo-
sition 1 says that wages are always at least at this level, but otherwise fall at the
rate given by the downward constraint. Whenever the wage lies above productivity,
the labour market fails to clear (and the participation constraint does not bind);
the larger the percentage gap, the larger is unemployment (as Nt = (wt=at)
  1
 ). We
show three wage simulations. For much of the time they are coincident with the
spot wage. The horizontal broken lines represent full downward rigidity (b (ht) = 1).
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Figure 1: TFP (thick line) and wage simulations
The shorter broken line gives the path predicted in Snell and Thomas (2009), and is
discussed below. The thin continuous line only visible before 1960 represents down-
ward nominal rigidity (using the CPI to represent prices). The reason the latter is
mostly coincident with productivity is that over the period 1955-2001 ination in
most years is greater in absolute value than negative sectoral productivity growth,
so that the nominal rigidity constraint has little bite. We return to this issue below
in Section 4.
We again stress that it is the interplay of the two constraints which matters
for unemployment outcomes. Downward rigidity in the absence of equal treatment,
would, in this model, not lead to deviations from full employment. In fact, individual
wages would be the same as those predicted by Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), where
wages are downward rigid but rise to prevent workers from quitting when wage o¤ers
from other rms rise above what was previously o¤ered to a worker.16 Critically,
this downward rigidity only applies to ongoing contracts, and would not apply to
16Under the productivity process they assume, this happens when productivity is higher than
previously attained during a workers current tenure. This is the equilibrium outcome in the
absence of both constraints, given risk averse workers, so the ad hoc downward constraint would
play no role.
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the wage contracts o¤ered to new hires, and consequently the labour market would
always clear. Alternatively, equal treatment per se does not lead to deviations from
Walrasian outcomes. If workers were risk neutral, for example, then wages which
tracked the spot wages would be optimal rms would be able to hire workers for
the minimum possible discounted wages but would still satisfy the participation
constraints.
When the two constraints coexist, however, any wage rigidity for incumbents
is also transmitted to new hires. And we saw in Lemmata 1 and 2 how in this
model equal treatment leads to the convenient property that wages above spot wages
imply unemployment and a non-binding participation constraint. Combined with
the other implication of Lemma 2 that wages must be at least at the spot level,
we can see that positive productivity shocks which push spot wages and hence
contract wages up followed by negative ones will lead to wages that are too high
to clear the market.
This property that wages are at least equal to spot levels, and su¢ ciently pos-
itive shocks therefore push wages up (so that they equal the spot wage and full
employment ensues), is a convenient implication of equal treatment and perfectly
competitive labour markets/perfectly mobile labour in this framework. It answers,
at least in this simple model, a question posed at the beginning of the paper: given
that adverse shocks which can leave wages too high should be anticipated by forward
looking rms, what determines the actual level of wages before the adverse shock
hits? A striking illustration of this point arises if we consider a two-period model
with high productivity a in period 1 and low productivity a in period 2, and suppose
there is full downward rigidity (b(h2) = 1). Proposition 1 asserts that the solution is
w1 = w2 = a, so that the wage in period 1 equals the high period 1 spot wage, and
in period 2 the wage is too high to clear the market, even though all rms anticipate
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this occurring.17
However, we conjecture that if labour was not perfectly mobile, the conclusion
would change. In a high productivity state a rm would face a trade-o¤between the
benets of raising its wage to retain/attract workers and the future costs of carrying
a higher wage forward which may constrain it in future adverse states. So one would
expect downward rigidity to constrain upward movements too.
In Snell and Thomas (2009) rigidity arises due to the desire to smooth wage
movements over time. If wages fall too fast then this imposes costs on the rm
because it has to compensate workers for this variability. On the other hand, the
same frontloading motive that was identied in the current model exists, so that
rms when unconstrained will want wages to fall over time. Balancing these two
forces provides a limit on how fast wages will fall. A problem, empirically, with
appealing to risk aversion as the explanation of wage rigidity in that model is that
to get plausible results it is necessary to assume that either workers are very risk
averse (so it is very costly to have wage variability), that the rate of turnover is
implausibly small (so the frontloading incentive is small) or that workers are more
patient than rms (which again weakens the frontloading incentive).18 This suggests
that the performance of the model may be improved if other sources of wage rigidity
are present.
17Intuitively, this is an equilibrium because a deviant rm cannot o¤er a lower constant wage
contract there is full employment in period 1 so no worker would accept this when higher paying
contracts are on o¤er. On the other hand, it cannot be the case that all rms o¤er a lower constant
wage contract in equilibrium as then w1 would be below a and so there would be an excess demand
for labour in period 1. A rm would then increase prots by deviating to a constant wage contract
o¤ering an innitessimally higher wage, so that it could hire as many workers as it chooses. A
higher constant wage contract cannot be an equilibrium as then w1 would be above a and there
would be unemployment; a rm could cut its wage o¤ering and still attract as many workers as it
wants.
18In Snell and Thomas (2009) it is argued that extending the model to allow for experience
dependent separation rates can help to resolve this problem.
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The current paper demonstrates that it is possible to incorporate wage rigidity
directly into the model. Given that we assumed that workers are risk averse, the
same forces limiting downward movements of wages are present in the current model,
so that if the downward rigidity constraint was su¢ ciently slack, it would be the
desire to smooth wages that would be the binding constraint.19
Finally, imposing two ad hoc constraints might lead one to think that there
will be large gains to be made if rms and workers can nd a way to avoid these
constraints. Here we argue that this is not so obvious. Importantly workers who
are employed benet from the interplay of the two constraints. Equilibrium wages
are never below spot wages and sometimes above. If the rm can get around equal
treatment, then it would benet by being able to hire in new workers in depressed
states at lower wages, but this does not benet incumbent workers. Indeed, to the
extent that the rm is unable to commit not to replace incumbents by cheaper new
hires, this has the potential for making incumbents worse o¤ given that it is in
unemployment states that the rm would attempt to replace them.
On the other hand, if the downward rigidity constraint is relaxed, a rm can
benet (i.e., protably deviate) from a policy that pays higher than spot wages in
the beginning (and when the labour market clears) but following the frontloading
argument lower wages than other rms when there is unemployment. This would
allow it to satisfy participation constraints in good states but take advantage of
cheap workers in bad states. Whether attempting to move to such a policy seems
reasonable depends on ones view of why downward rigidity might exist in the rst
place. There may be an element of implicit contracting involved; in fact it can be
shown that if rms follow an implicit contract in which real wages are downward
19Some risk aversion is needed in order to make the prot function concave in the proof of
Lemma 3. In Figure 1 the simulation with downward nominal rigidity lies below that from the
Snell-Thomas model. This implies that under the parameters assumed in the latter, the nominal
constraint would not bind.
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rigid then each rm will have an incentive to keep to the equilibrium contract that we
derived it will be incentive compatible to raise the wage to the spot level when the
incentive constraint binds even if the state is not veriable. In such an informational
environment, workers may be suspicious of a contract which allows rms to cut
wages considerably, making the deviation contract mentioned above unpalatable.
Bewleys evidence seems to support this view of downward rigidity as being part of
an implicit contract: the main drawback of pay cuts is that they ll the air with
disappointment and an impression of breached promise [emphasis added](Bewley
(1998, p. 480)).20
3.2.1 Uncertainty
The above arguments do not generalise to the case of uncertainty. Lemma 3 may fail
as the frontloading of the wage contract between periods t and t+ 1 in a particular
state may now a¤ect future wages in other possible states at t + 1 the wage at t
is increased, so if the downward constraint binds in some other state at t + 1 this
will imply the wage increases in that state, which may be costly. However, we can
show that if T = 2 this problem cannot arise. For simplicity assume b (h2) = 1 all
h2 (downward real rigidity).
Proposition 2 If T = 2; and b (h2) = 1 all h2, there is a symmetric equilibrium in
which wt = maxt0tw

t0.
Proof. To establish this we convert the rms choice variable (contract) from
wages (wt(ht))
2
t=1 to utilities (ut(ht))
2
t=1. We can formulate Problem DWR faced by
the rm as:
max
(ut(ht))
2
t=1
E
"
2X
t=1
()t 1(ut(ht); at)
#
(Problem AR)
20Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger (1997) provide experimental evidence that implicit contracts
can be enforced by such reciprocity.
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subject to ~Vt (ht)   (ht) (18)
for all positive probability ht; 2  t  1, and
ut (ht 1; s)  u (ht 1) ; (19)
where ~Vt (ht) is dened recursively as before by:
~Vt (ht) = u(wt(ht)) + E

Vt+1 (ht+1) + (1  )t+1 j ht

; (20)
with ~V3 = 0. The maximand is strictly concave (see the proof of Lemma 3) and
the constraints are linear. The Slater condition is satised by, for all ht, ut(ht) =
u(w(ht) + "), for " > 0. Moreover it is straightforward but tedious to show that
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are satised at the putative equilibrium contract, hence
the putative solution solves Problem DWR.
For T  3 we can construct counterexamples to the putative equilibrium, but
only if there are shocks su¢ ciently bad that productivity falls in a range close to :
We do not have an analytical result however.21
4 Simulations
In this section we assess to what extent the model is consistent with some relevant
labour market stylised facts. In particular, we gauge whether the model can generate
a plausible degree of unemployment volatility from measured total factor produc-
tivity shocks using US post war aggregate unemployment and productivity (TFP)
data from the Bureau for Labor Statistics (BLS), and how well wage/unemployment
regressions on simulated data correspond to existing stylised facts. In a single sec-
tor, unemployment falls to zero whenever the productivity shock is not too bad.
21We simulated models with iid two-state multiplicative productivity processes up to T = 13: For
example, for  = :8, we conrmed the putative equilibrium for a wided range of other parameter
values, provided at+1=at was at least approximately :82 with probability one.
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Using the multisector model, however, in which each sector will be subject to an
idiosyncratic productivity shock, we will obtain more realistic unemployment levels
because it is less likely that all labour markets will simultaneously clear; moreover
when the aggregate productivity shock is positive, there will be more sectors with
low unemployment and consequently aggregate employment is likely to be lower.
Given knowledge of the models parameters, given an initial time period where
there was full employment and given a TFP series, it is possible to generate the
sectoral real wageseries that would be predicted by versions of our theory. We
can only assert that this is an equilibrium if there is no uncertainty, so each sectoral
sequence is perfectly anticipated, although as noted above, we conjecture that this
is also an equilibrium with uncertainty provided shocks are not too negative. It is
then possible to derive the corresponding implications for unemployment (rates),
and also the relationship between real wages and unemployment.
In accordance with the theory developed earlier, we generate for each sector
separate predicted wage and unemployment series, using actual U.S. manufacturing
industry multifactor productivity processes for the 17 manufacturing sectors pro-
vided by the BLS for the period 1949-2001.22 This xes the variability of shocks
and their correlation across sectors, and also allows us to generate a simulated unem-
ployment series which can be directly compared to the data. None of our theoretical
results depended on the sectors being of the same size, so our results readily extend
to this asymmetric case; indeed allowing sector sizes to vary over time would also
be a straightforward extension. We then aggregate the models predicted unemploy-
ment for each of these sectors using mid-period unemployment shares as weights23
(we start simulations at full employment and spot wages in 1949, allowing 6 years
for unemployment to develop in each sector, so we only use the period 1955-2001
22This is the only sectoral TFP series available for such a long time scale and collected on a
consistent basis.
23We add 3.5% to represent a constant frictional rate.
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for our results). Recall that this involves assuming that each sectoral labour market
is segmented so we can compute unemployment in each sector independently, and
then aggregate.
We do two things. First we look at the predicted unemployment series and
compare this with the actual US experience. Secondly, we examine the relationship
between real wages and unemployment over the business cycle.
To simulate unemployment, we consider in Figure 2 the cases of full downward
real rigidity (thick broken line) and downward nominal rigidity (thin broken line);
aside from the level of rigidity, there is only one degree of freedom, the choice of
 the curvature of the production function. For downward real rigidity we use a
logarithmic production function ( = 1).24 However it should be remarked that as
manufacturing is only a fraction of the entire economy (and becoming smaller over
time), comparing the predicted unemployment rate for our model manufacturing
economy with the general unemployment rate, as we do, is inappropriate. Never-
theless, the value of  essentially determines only the extent to which a non-market
clearing wage translates into unemployment; it does not a¤ect the equilibrium wage
path but only magnies the unemployment uctuations as it falls in size. Thus if the
remaining economy was composed of a residual sector with constant unemployment,
the similar uctuations in the economy wide unemployment rate would result from
choosing a lower value for  (which enhances uctuations). For the downward nom-
inal rigidity we use a lower value of  = 0:2 (the series is even atter with  = 1).
Even so, there is far too little variation in unemployment, and as already remarked
in Section 3.2, the constraint only has bite at the start of our period and towards
24Estevão and Wilson (1998) found a short-run demand elasticity ranging between close to zero
and -0.71 with aggregate data based on BLS manufacturing data for a similar period that we study,
and of between -0.5 and -0.89 at the 4-digit industry level for manufacturing. An elasticity of -0.71
would correspond to a vlaue of  of about 1.4. Hamermesh (1993) reports that an elasticity of
around  0:3 is typical. Note that the value of the risk aversion parameter, , does not a¤ect the
solution (it is relevant for the value of b; however).
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the end, when the ination rate was low.
Figure 2: Unemployment simulations (broken lines) and actual annual US rate (solid
line), 1955-2001
Given there is only one degree of freedom (together with an assumed constant
frictional rate of unemployment which shifts the simulated series up or down), the
simulation with downward real rigidity tracks unemployment surprisingly well until
towards the end of the simulation. The actual standard deviation of the unemploy-
ment rate was 1.5% over our period; the simulated series has a standard deviation
of 1.7%. What seems to be happening towards 2001 is that some sectors experi-
ence a su¢ ciently long trend of poor productivity shocks that unemployment in
those sectors builds up with completely downward rigid wages. It is clearly unreal-
istic to suppose that labour wouldnt in the long-run move out of these sectors, so
even if downward rigidity was appropriate we should expect to see lower unemploy-
ment towards the end of the period than the simulation suggests. Allowing wages
to fall somewhat reduces simulated unemployment particularly towards the end of
the simulation. However keeping to the logarithmic production function we nd
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that unemployment variability falls; for example if real wages can fall at 1% p.a.
(b(ht) = 0:99) we nd the standard deviation falls to 1.0%, and for a fall of 2%, we
get a standard deviation of 0.7%.25
For our second exercise, we follow the studies of real wage cyclicality that have
looked at how wages respond to contemporaneous unemployment movements. While
there is a huge literature on this, a very rough summary would be that wages are
roughly acyclical, or mildly procyclical, with panel studies consistently pointing
towards the latter. For example, using the PSID for men over the period of 1968-69
to 86-87, Solon, Barsky, and Parker (Feb 1994) found that a one percentage point
reduction in the unemployment rate leads to a rise in the real wage rate of 1.4
percent. Similar estimates are found in Shin (Oct 1994) and Devereux (Jul 2001).
From our simulations, we can regress real wage changes on changes in unemployment
to replicate the typical regression undertaken in the panel studies.
Most studies which use longitudinal data of real wage cyclicality, following Bils
(1985), estimate the following:
 lnwit = Ut + t+ 
0Xit + "it; (21)
where  lnwit is the di¤erence between the natural logarithm of worker is real wage
rate in year t and his log real wage in year t   1, Ut is the year-to-year change
in the unemployment rate, and Xit is a vector containing an intercept and time
varying individual characteristics. The equation also includes a linear time trend
(i.e., corresponding to a quadratic in t in levels). We ran the regression equation
(21) on our 47 years of simulated data. Since all workers have identical productivity
25Real wage falls in this region do not seem implausible. For example, Elsby (2009) charts the
distribution of real wage changes in the PSID over 1983-1992, a relatively low ination period (so
surprise ination is less likely to lead to unanticipated real wage falls); there is a spike around 2-4%
for real wage falls, and they rarely exceed about 6%. Likewise Christophides and Stengos (2003)
nd from Canadian wage contract data in the unionized sector that most real wage reductions in
the 1990s were of the order of 1-2%.
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in our model, there are no distinguishing individual characteristics.
Under full downward real rigidity and a logarithmic production function, the
estimate of , the unemployment semi-elasticity of the wage, is  0:25 (all reported
coe¢ cients are signicant). That it is negative is perhaps unsurprising with full
downward rigidity, for example, wages only change in a sector when there is full
employment, in which case they rise. Aggregating across sectors, a fall in unem-
ployment will tend to be associated with more sectors having full employment and
consequently wages rising in more sectors. Again, allowing the real wage to fall
by 1% and 2% we get respective  estimates of -0.44 and -0.72.26 While these
are correctly signed, their magnitude is on the low side compared with the studies
mentioned above. They do improve on the performance of the model in Snell and
Thomas (2009) however. Running the same regression gives a coe¢ cient of +0.51,
incorrectly signed.
5 Concluding Comments
This paper has analysed a model with downward rigidities in which rms cannot
pay discriminate based on year of entry to a rm. We solved for the dynamics
of wages and unemployment under conditions of downward wage rigidity, where
forward looking rms take into account these constraints. We found that the equi-
librium could be solved for under conditions of certainty. Using actual productivity
data based on the post-war US economy, we analysed the ability of the model to
match certain stylised labour market facts, and found that it was able to generate
su¢ cient variability of unemployment, and also match to an extent the empirical
wage-unemployment relationship.
26If we simultaneously change  to maintain the variability of unemployment, however, the
coe¢ cient stays close to the -0.25 estimate.
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